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The role of the warrior and armed force is integral to most functioning societies. 
Sometimes the warrior's role is transparent, and at other times it is hidden or con-
tained within governing institutions. Every governing authority must seek to find 
balance between both the warrior and the courtier, between those who ultimately 
must provide for law and order and those who seek to govern without relying on 
overt force. Korea during much of its last dynasty, Chos6n (1392-1910), accepted 
the notion of civil supremacy, that the courtier should rule. And yet even in the 
20th century Korea grappled with the issue of warrior vs. courtier, military vs. civil 
as for nearly three decades (1961-1993) the country cast off the mantle of civil rule 
and generals controlled policy. 
     During the growth of Korea's first states, the so-called Three Kingdoms era 
(?-661), men who bore arms and governed through strategic military alliances 
commanded these societies. Warrior aristocrats also dominated Korea's first unified 
state, Silla (661-935). And although its leaders introduced Chinese governing 
institutions and sought to govern through orderly administrative agencies, the warrior 
remained the hero of the age, and armed might remained the arbiter. When Silla 
collapsed, Korea fell into numerous warring regions where local warriors once again 
controlled the future. 
     Kory-O(918-1392) is very much a transitional period between the age of the 
warrior aristocrat who epitomized Silla and the era of the yangban civil official of 
Chos6n. Within the five centuries that mark Kory-0, the tensions that separated the 
warrior and courtier emerged starkly as Koryo- grappled with issues of governance. 
In Kory6, initially founded by a general, civil leadership quickly took over and 
subordinated the warriors. By the middle of the 12th century the warriors struck 
back and took control of the kingdom for a century. In the final years of the 
dynasty (1270-1392) a reckoning between these rival forces emerged that set the 
stage for the reassertion of civil supremacy in Chos6n. This paper will investigate 
the tensions that divided the warrior and the courtier, the military and civil authorities, 
in Kory-o and how Koryo- searched for equilibrium between the warrior and courtier, 
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resolving this major tension that had fractured the country. The paper will also make 
comparisons as appropriate with contemporary developments in China and Japan. 
The Rise of Kory6 
When Silla's centralized command withered in the late ninth and early tenth centuries, 
warriors quickly filled the power vacuum. By the start of the tenth century the 
Korean peninsula fell under the command of three competing powers. Silla still 
exercised the last vestiges of authority in the southeast. A new commander, Ky-Onhw-on, 
emerged in the southwest, and toward the north in the center of the peninsula first 
a warrior named Kfingye and then ultimately Koryo-'s dynastic founder, Wang Ko-n, 
appeared. Through strategic alliances that often were decided on the battlefield, these 
men consolidated their power. But Ky6nhwo-n and Wang K-on emerged as the 
generals who struggled to reunify Korea. 
     Wang Ko-n grew up beside the Injin river estuary in the home of a prominent 
family that had prospered off maritime trade along Korea's west coast and even in 
China. At an early age he led troops under the local strongman, KU^ngye, and 
showed skill in leadership and tactics. He quickly emerged as a prominent warrior 
and challenged Kangye for leadership in 918 when he founded the Kory-O dynasty. 
Wang K-on was successful in part because Kfingye became increasingly tyrannical, 
allegedly committing a number of aberrant deeds. He also was successful because 
he gained the confidence of other warriors who were seeking to augment their own 
authority and security through alliances. After becoming king in 918, Wang KO-n had 
to confront KyO-nhw6n directly for control of the peninsula. By using his skill as a 
tactician on land as well as his knowledge of maritime warfare, Wang K-On, struggling 
through more than a decade of warfare, defeated Ky6nhwo-n and unified the kingdom 
in 936. 
     It was his prowess as a general that enabled Wang Ko^n to unite the kingdom, 
but to govern the new country he would have to draw on his ability to lead as a 
king. Wang K6n confronted the old dilemma that beset many warriors: how to balance 
and satisfy the needs and expectations of the warriors who had won the battles and 
the demands for governance and stability. To Koryo^ this was especially acute given 
that the society had experienced nearly a century of warfare in which the warrior 
determined policy, and yet for the new leadership to survive, fighting would have 
to be contained and governance that fostered peace become the norm. Wang K66n 
searched for policies that would pacify his warrior allies and convert them into 
courtiers. 
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     Wang K-On set out to co-opt his former generals into supporting his new 
regime. He included the armies of his generals into a central army with his own 
personal force at the heart of the palace guards. He gave the generals titles and 
official functions within the new government and also granted many of them special 
privileges to retain a semblance of authority in their home regions. He was constant 
in his search for methods to weaken the military power of his allies. To prevent his 
allies and other regional lords from gaining too much authority, he demanded that 
they send a family member to serve in his court as kiin. The implications of this 
hostage system are manifold and it did help him secure his authority. He also 
sought to co-opt his warriors by offering them marriage into his family with Wang 
K-On himself taking 29 wives. To others he offered the Wang surname as a reward. 
     If Wang K-On sought to contain the aspirations of his warrior allies, he also 
sought to foster the courtier. There is an ancient Chinese belief that although a 
country may be won by the sword, it must be governed by the pen. Wang K-on, 
from the time he established his dynasty, vigorously sought to foster able admini-
stration, encouraging the appointment of talented men and urging officials to perform 
their duties properly'. Beforehe died in 943, he issued ten injunctions to his posterity 
urging that attention be given to fostering Buddhism and guarding against the 
destruction of topography. Wang K-on was especially concerned with good governance, 
which to him meant the need for good officials who could heed criticism. He 
recruited men with civilian abilities into his new government and, couching the ten 
injunctions in Confucian terms, urged his descendants to heed loyal criticism and 
rule with virtue and benevolence. But he also cautioned that the warrior not be 
forgotten, stating: "Treat soldiers kindly and take good care of them; lighten their 
burden of forced labor; inspect them every autumn; give honors and promotions to 
the brave. 112 Wang K-On pursued a policy that promised rewards for both warrior and 
courtier. 
Dynastic Consolidation and Civil Supremacy 
In the decades that followed Wang K6n's death, the succeeding kings charted a 
course that put civil institutions and the courtiers in charge of dynastic policy and 
forced the warrior into a subordinate role. Three sons of Wang K6n in succession 
inherited the throne as Hyejong (943-945), ChOgiong (945-949), and Kwangjong 
(949-975). Animosities between warriors and courtiers marred all three reigns. No 
sooner was Hyejong in power than military strongmen tried to wrest authority from 
the new king'. After a short, turbulent reign of two years, his brother succeeded. 
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ChOngjong, eager to free himself from the power politics that swirled around the 
Kory6 capital, Kaegybng, sought to move the capital north to modem Pyongyang, 
and although this policy likewise failed, threats to the authority of the monarch did 
not diminish. Wang K-on, as the founding monarch, had armed strength and legitimacy 
to stave off attacks from other warriors. His sons struggled to bolster royal authority. 
     Kwangjong, the fourth Koryb monarch, ultimately faced his challengers and 
firmly planted the foundations of royal authority. To check the latent power of the 
warrior, he pursued many policies. On a positive note, he sought to elevate the 
prestige of the court by claiming the title of emperor (hwang) and calling Kaegy6ng 
an imperial city (hwangdo). He also sought to recruit men with civil backgrounds 
and earned eternal respect for establishing the civil service examination as a means 
of recruitment in 958. The implications of this act were far reaching, leading to the 
expansion of schools, the foundation of Confucian discourse in the kingdom, and the 
rudiments of a bureaucratic system based on merit. Besides recruiting talented civil 
officials to help him govern, he also turned to China and invited able men from 
there to serve as court advisers. 
     Kwangjong's treatment of men with warrior background was much harsher. 
During the wars that accompanied the collapse of Silla and the rise of Koryo-, many 
people had been enslaved by local strongmen. This enslaved population became an 
important element of economic power for warriors, but it threatened the economic 
base of the kingdom. Kwangjong initiated the Slave Review Act, which called for 
the manumission of people who had formerly been commoners, restoring them to a 
free status and thereby directly undermining the economic foundations of warrior 
authority. When he met resistance to these measures, Kwangjong launched a major 
purge of all who refused to bend to royal will. In the years that followed, the purge 
did not even spare the men who had fought along side of Wang K-on. In this way 
Kwangjong successfully subdued the warrior and tilted Kory6 authority toward 
favoring the courtier. 
     The two succeeding reigns saw the consolidation of civil authority. 
Kwangjong's son and successor, Ky6ngjong (975-981), mindful that the system 
Kwangjong had initiated needed an economic foundation, pushed through the 
Stipend Land Law (ch6nsikwa), which guaranteed a fixed payment to men in the 
government structure. Through this new order, the military official came under dy-
nastic fiscal control. Although there seems to have been equal rewards for warrior 
and courtier alike, this stipend system ultimately would be used to elevate civilian 
status over military status. 
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     During S6ngjong's reign (981-991) a clear distinction between the warrior 
and courtier emerged. The term yangban first appeared at this time to denote the 
two categories or divisions of civil and military, and the first inklings of a hierarchy 
dividing these orders emerged. Ch'oe Su-ngno (927-989), one of early Kory-O's greatest 
thinkers, in a twenty-eight-point memorial to S6ngjong laid the foundations for this 
new system of governance that saw the elevation of the civilian courtier. Ch'oe 
sought to bring Confucian norms directly into the operation of governance and 
called for frugality and attention to the teachings of Confucius. He also urged the 
king to expand government operations to include a provincial system that would 
help Kory6's central authority exercise control over the countryside.' In launching 
this reform that established the outlines of a provincial system, S6ngjong laid the 
foundation for the central authority to intrude into the countryside and check the 
latent power of regional strongmen. Then in 987 he further weakened the authority 
of the regional warrior by demanding all weapons be turned into the central govern-
ment and then be forged into agricultural implements. 
      What followed was a major construction of Kory6's governance system in 
which the administrative structure, very much modeled on Chinese systems, developed. 
The civilian official figured prominently in this order. The civil service examination 
became a regularly administered test and one excellent means to recruit men into 
government. S6ngjong oversaw the establishment of schools in the capital in part to 
prepare scholars for this examination and also dispatched scholars to the countryside 
to foster learning there. The end of the tenth century saw the firm foundations of 
courtier rule. 
     At the same time, S6ngjong and his successors tried to institutionalize military 
power, and starting in about 995 the court established the Two Armies and Six 
Guards, which became the standing fighting force of the kingdom. Although these 
units still carried elements of the first king's warrior allies, the state brought the 
military under its institutional control.' The generals who commanded these forces 
may have retained aristocratic pedigrees, but the men who soldiered in the units 
.were drawn from a special class known as military class families, kunban ssijok.' 
These were the families that provided men to serve as soldiers and in turn received 
special allotments from the state as salary. This system, quite distinct from the 
Chinese fu-ping order which saw a peasant army, brought a degree of professionalism 
and distinction to Kory6's standing forces. Peasants played a role as corvee laborers 
during regularly planned periods, and in the event of a major invasion, the state 
conscripted peasants to serve as a fighting force. Nevertheless the task of daily
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arms-bearing remained under the control of a specially designated class. 
     With these reforms, thewarrior gradually moved into a position of subordination 
to the courtier, and this became most apparent with the development in 998 of a 
government rank scale that divided the civil and military. Briefly, a two-tiered, nine-rank 
scale developed in which the civilian leadership occupied places on all nine ranks 
(each rank had an upper and lower category) while military officers were prohibite d-
from moving above the third level. To advance further military officers would have 
to give up their military status and become a civil official, an act that went counter 
to the nonn in the first half of the dynasty. At the same time, the state refined the 
stipend scale, which paid more to the civil official in the same rank. For example, 
a grand general, the highest military position, received a prebend of of 130 ky6l of 
various lands while his civilian counterpart at the same official rank received 
a prebend of of 140 ky6I of land. This inequity would not be corrected 
until 1076.' 
     Other ways in which the role of the warrior fell in relation to the 
civil officials can be seen in placing the two northern frontier defense 
districts under the control of a civilian Military Commissioner (py6ngmasa) 
who held the rank of upper third. The organization of the Two Armies 
and Six Guards likewise diffused military power by making each unit 
separate and independent, thereby denying any one military official the 
opportunity to take command of the entire military force. The military 
force in turn was placed under the direction of the Ministry of Military 
Affairs (py6ngbu), which was almost always run by civilian officials. 
     From Sbngjong's reign until the military coup of 1170, Kory-O consciously 
followed a policy of civil supremacy. The courtier or civilian occupied the positions 
of authority. Military officials rarely ventured to China on diplomatic missions, and 
military officers almost never entered into the highest positions in the government 
or sat on the esteemed Security Council, which deliberated major policy for the 
kingdom. The degree to which military officials were isolated from decision making 
emerges with glaring poignancy in Oijong's reign (1146-1170). Ninety-six men were 
found to have held positions in the civil dynastic structure in that reign.' The paucity 
of source materials remains a key hindrance in exhaustively investigating the lives 
of many of these men. 
             Civil Composition: fTijong's Reign, 1146-1170 
                        total 96 
                      civilian 91 (95%) 
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                      military 5 ( 5%) 
                        examination 41 (42%)
These were the men who held positions in the offices of prestige in the civil dynastic 
structure such as the Royal Secretariat and Chancellery, the Security Council, the 
Censorate, and the Six Ministries and who acted as official examiners for the state 
examination. Of that number, five or 5% claimed a military lineage. None of these 
men reached the highest decision-making organ, the State Council (Chaesang). None 
was in the Security Council which determined military policy nor in the bastions of 
civil control, the Ministry of Personnel, Mininstry of Rites and the Censorial organs. 
Instead, two found appointments in the Ministry of Military Affairs and one each in 
the Ministries of Punishments, Revenue, and Public Works. Three of the five also 
held positions in the largely honorary Department of Ministries (Sangso-dosong).' 
     Govemirnent became the responsibility of the civilian scholar, and the ruling 
ideology of the day was rooted in Confucian principles. Koryo- increasingly adapted 
Chinese norms of governance during the early Kory-O period and adhered to the 
Chinese dictum that as you do not use good iron to make nails, neither do you use 
good men and make them into soldiers. Civilian lineages such as the Ky6ngju Kim, 
the Kwangsan Kim, the KyOngwon Yi , and the Haeju Ch'oe monopolized positions 
of prestige for a number of consecutive generations. As in China at this time, civilians 
occupied positions of prestige, and civil aristocrats sat at the pinnacle of the social 
hierarchy. 
     One of the ironies of this tilt toward the civilian is that it came at a time 
when there was an increase in the demand for military defense. In 993 the Khitan, 
who occupied the land north of Kory-0, sent their first invasion force into Kory-O 
territory. Although the dynasty initially successfully countered this attack, the Khitan 
would launch two more invasions at the start of the tenth century, bringing serious 
disruptions to the kingdom. The need for a strong defense was clear, but the men 
who led the counterattacks were not trained warriors but rather civil officials. The 
state called on the standing capital armies to defend Kaegyong and the court and 
dispatched emergency armies under civilian leaders to march north to block the 
enemy. Disturbances within the court actually abetted the Khitan attacks in 1009. 
When Kang Cho, a military commander in the northwest and disgruntled over court 
policy, deposed King Mokchong in 1009, the Khitan used the incident to attack. 
     Once Kory-O restored peace in 1018, it embarked on a century and half of 
stability and internal growth that saw the civil officials at the acme of authority and 
the warrior feeling neglected. During this long period there were moments when the 
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state summoned generals to rise to the kingdom's defense. At the start of the twelfth 
century, Jurchen invaders in the north threatened Kory-O's borders which led to the 
dispatch of armies. In 1126, a civil aristocrat threatened the survival of the dynasty 
and again military men had to step in to remove the challenger. In 1135 a monk 
sought to split the kingdom and establish a new capital in the north, once demand-
ing again a military deployment. In each of these incidents, military officials played 
roles of subordination to civil authorities, who charted policy. Yet military support 
remained crucial in the denouement of events, and generals did not forget their role 
in protecting the dynasty. 
     Socially the status of the warrior was ambiguous. Both military and civil 
officials who had reached rank five or above in the nine-tiered rank order were 
automatically accorded special privileges such as the right to name an heir to a gov-
ernment post, admission for their children to special schools, and certain land grants. 
Several men from elite military families such as the Kigye No and Ch'ungju Yang 
lineages placed men in exalted civil positions. In 1110 the dynasty inaugurated a 
military examination that established certain levels of competence for each rank. The 
appointment of soldiers based on skill raised the professionalism of the military. 
     And yet by the middle of the twelfth century, Koryo-'s generals and soldiers 
were so discontent that they rose in rebellion. Clearly they had grievances and these 
festered throughout the early decades of the twelfth century. The military 
examination that had been so widely lauded when started came to an abrupt end in 
1133, twenty-three years after it began, because civil officials were jealous over the 
advances achieved by military officials 10. Lower-ranked officers and common soldiers 
frequently found themselves performing demeaning tasks such as digging ditches or 
completing other public works projects." Despite their invaluable contributions in 
defending the kingdom, the social, political, and economic institutions of the dynasty 
trapped the Koryo- warrior. This situation is even more ironic in that the Koryo-
civilian elite modeled much of the dynastic governance on a Chinese Sung system 
that was failing to withstand the onslaught of the Jurchen." Furthermore, the events 
may well have impacted the standing of the military in still another manner. As 
Kory-O's northern border became stabilized in the 1140s, Koryo- felt less pressure to 
defend its borders. This situation might well have "facilitated the downgrading of 
Koryo-'s military establishment to the advantage of the civil officialdom."" For all 
these reasons, the military chafed under civilian dominance. 
     The grievances of the military exploded during the reign of fjijong (1146-
1170) and ended with the coup of 1170. fJijong was fond of pleasure and travel. 
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On parties that went late into the night, Uijong's military escorts stood guard and 
protected both the king and his courtiers as they sank into intoxication. Civil officials, 
becoming arrogant, on occasion urinated on the guards and ridiculed them in many 
other ways. In one event, according to the Koryo-sa, General Chong Chungbu, a 
stately man of over six feet and later a leader of the 1170 revolt, had his long gray 
beardburntas a practical joke by a courtier ftom an elite aristocratic family". 
Eunuchs also played jokes on military officers, sparking acrimony. U Hagyu, a military 
officer, revealed a brewing discontent among the military when he recounted, "My 
father once warned , The military officials have seen injustice for too long. Is it 
possible for them not be indignant?"' 
Military Rule (1170-1270) 
     With the coup of 1170, generals took control of the kingdom, but the new 
leadership did not dismantle the existing dynastic civil structure. Certain civil elements 
were important in effecting the coup, and these civil elites worked closely with the 
military officials. Furthermore, to administer the kingdom, the military leaders under-
stood the necessity of using the civil structure. It possessed the mechanisms to collect 
taxes and administer policy. By maintaining and even outwardly appearing to protect 
the dynasty and its civilian heritage, the military leaders gained legitimacy for their 
authority. 
     By the middle of My6ngjong's reign (1170-1197), despite the early efforts of 
the coup leaders and the support rendered by a number of civil officials, Kory6 was 
on the brink of collapse. Generals struggled for power with generals, leaving to Yi 
Ulmin, a man of slave origins with the notoriety of having murdered the former 
king Oijong, the opportunity to seize control. For more than ten years Yi Oimin 
dominated the kingdom, which was in the process of disintegration as slave, monk, 
and peasant rebellions erupted throughout the land. Ultimately this degenerate social 
and political situation reached a nadir that was checked by the rise of yet another 
general, Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n." 
     Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n and his descendants, boasting an elite military lineage, 
immediately set about to rebuild the kingdom and over the next sixty years launched 
a series of reforms and institutional innovations that brought a measure of stability 
and security to Koryo6. Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n slowly developed policies that ultimately 
would secure his authority and contain the forces that were tearing apart the dynasty. 
In the end he would rely on a dual structure that included both formal dynastic 
organs and his own private mechanisms of control to dominate the kingdom, but 
initially he attempted to achieve political stability by relying on traditional 
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government offices. 
     The men Ch'oe Ch'unghbn recruited into his government afford insight into 
his policies and show that although the warrior dominated society, the courtier 
remained significant. Examining the men who held the top positions in the new 
government, the following results appear: 
           Civil Composition: Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n's rule, 1196-1219" 
                      total 80 
                    civilian 43 (54%) 
                      civilian ? 10
                    military 16 (20%)
                     both 3 
                        unclear 18
                      examination 20 (25%)
                       Ch'oe family 6 
     The most obvious point is the small percentage of men with military back-
grounds in the civil dynastic structure. Clearly in this age of "military domination," 
civilians controlled a majority of the offices, accounting for at least 54% (43 men) 
of the people in these offices. Similarly the state examination remained an important 
avenue of entrance for civilians. At a minimum, twenty men (25%) passed the 
examination. Under Ch'oe Ch'unghOn, examinations were held at frequent intervals 
and the number of men passing per year shows a dramatic increase." 
     Civilian families continued to hold the majority of positions in the State 
Council. Names from such prominent lineages as the ChOngan Im, the Ch'angw6n 
Ch'oe, and the Ky6ngju Kim are present. Im Yu, the nephew of kings I~ijong, 
Mybngjong, and Sinjong (1197-1204), served in the State Council from the start of 
Ch'oe Ch'unghbn's rule." Ch'oe Tang and Ch'oe S6n, brothers and Tongju Ch'oe 
clansmen, both passed the state examination and worked in the State Council.2' Kim 
Pongmo of the Ky6ngju Kim clan offers another example of a man from a promi-
nent lineage working closely with Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n." Also present are men from 
the Hae . u Ch'oe clan and the Munhwa Yu lineage. Missing from this elite group are 
such lineages as the Ky6ngwbn Yi and the Kwangsan Kim, families that dominated 
the dynasty a century earlier. 
     Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n depended on civilian lineages and the civilian structure to 
sustain his power. Legitimacy was foremost in his mind once he took control of the 
kingdom militarily in 1196. By gaining the cooperation of the civilian elite at this 
crucial time, he could consolidate his authority. Possessing the administrative ability 
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to run the government, civilian leaders provided him with the expertise needed to 
govern the kingdom as they became an able arm in securing Ch'oe authority." He 
worked through the State Council and ministries and even assumed a number of po-
sitions in these offices. Ch'oe Ch'unghOn also watched with interest proceedings in 
the censorial offices, holding positions there too. 
     Ch'oe Ch'unghbn could not ignore the traditional mechanisms of dynastic 
governing. Although later historians clearly interpreted his rule as a corrupt usurpa-
tion," Ch'oe consciously assembled the State Council to consider matters pertaining 
to the royal family. When confronted with Sinjong's impending death, he especially 
relied on the State Council to provide an aura of stability as the dynastic mandate 
passed from one king to another. When other matters relating to the treatment of the 
royal family arose, Ch'oe Ch'unghOn again summoned the State Council for delib-
erations." The State Council also frequently met with Ch'oe Ch'unghbn to participate 
in ceremonial functions and attend state banquets." 
     Although civilians dominated most of the offices in the civil structure, the 
military tone of the age is obvious. In the Ministry of Military Affairs only half of 
the six men identified were cleariy civilian officials. A similar ratio is seen in the 
Censorate. Military men, in marked contrast to Uijong's reign, were performing im-
portant functions in key dynastic offices. Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n reassembled the Council 
of Generals, which first played a significant role in administration after the 1170 
coup, to help determine policy." Moreover, military officials joined official missions 
to the Jurchen Chin state in northern China repeatedly during Ch'oe Ch'unghbn's 
     17 rule. Military men performed many civil functions, but the opposite also occurred 
as men trained in letters became military officers. The military period produced a 
new fluidity in service alignment as men with dual heritages in both the civil and 
military traditions moved from branch to branch." 
     Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n devised that his son U (d. 1249) would inherit his authority, 
and U in turn transferred his power to his son Hang (d. 1257). During U's rule a 
new opponent, the Mongols, threatened Kory-0. To confront this mighty foe, the 
Ch'oe House enlisted both dynastic forces and their own private troops. When these 
bodies proved unable to cut the flow of Mongols, the Ch'oe House mobilized monks 
and peasants and also inaugurated several new fighting forces. Despite the Ch'oe 
House's spirited defense of Kory6, the military officials were unable to block the 
Mongols. The chaos rendered by the Mongols weakened the Ch'oe authority, open-
ing the path for a full resurgence of civil control. 
     Even before the last Ch'oe leader, Ch'oe (Ji, fell in 1258, civilian leadership 
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had clearly reemerged. In fact, civilian domination had never been totally eliminated 
during the military period. Although Koryo-'s military officials had determined 
policy for nearly a century, they discovered they could govern effectively only by 
relying on civilian expertise. By sustaining civilian leadership, they gained added 
legitimacy, but they also had to foster civilian ideology, which ultimately challenged 
the idea of rule by military officials. Within this system, the king occupied the 
pinnacle of authority. Although the Ch'oe leaders manipulated the throne to suit 
their needs, they publicly deferred to the kings of Kory6 to foster unity, and it was 
in this dual structure that the seeds of Ch'oe destruction germinated. In the end, 
both internal conditions and the external Mongol invasions destroyed military rule. 
     As civil leaders reemerged during the Ch'oe rule, the character of Kory-o 
society also changed. The distinctions between military and civilian became blurred, 
leading to a mixing of the branches. Military officers passed the state examination, 
indicating a new era where officers received training in Confucian learning and were 
well read in the classics. Civilians, less rigid, no longer refused to assume military 
posts. The composition of clans mirrors these changes. During early Kory6, certain 
clans had separate military lines, now differences were even visible within genera-
tions. Kybngju Kim clansman Vaesb, a civil official, had a number of sons: one be-
came a civil official and two became military officials. ChOng Sukeh'Om, a noted 
general of the Hadong ChOng clan, had a son who passed the state examination, 
becoming a civil official." Mutual trust and cooperation replaced the conflicts and 
antagonisms that had erupted between military and civilian elements in Uijong's and 
then MyOngiong's reigns. One's service background was no longer a barrier to office 
holding. 
     Both Japan and Korea entered their era of military rule at nearly the same 
time, and their experiences mirrored each other in a number of ways. Disputes 
among the civil elites in both courts resulted in conflicts that warriors joined to settle. 
After a period of initial jockeying for power, Minamoto Yoritomo in Japan and Ch'oe 
Ch'ungh6n in Korea emerged to give new direction to each country. As these 
generals took control, they shrouded their acts with the mantle of royal or imperial 
legitimacy. At the same time, they established institutions independent of the court, 
depending on a dual system of public and private agencies to rule. To fill these 
offices, they both recruited men to serve them personally, relying on a retainer system. 
Through these mechanisms, both introduced an efficient system of rule and strength-
ened their control over their respective societies. 
     Despite these similarities, in structure the two rules were fundamentally 
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different, and after 100 years, Korea reverted to a civil order while Japan's warriors 
established societal standards for many more centuries. The Kamakura hierarchy was 
always much more autonomous of the imperial court compared to the Ch'oe House's 
relation with the Koryo- court. In Japan by late Heian a defined tradition of govern-
ance through private, personal relations had emerged that did not exist in Koryo6. 
The Koryo- state exercised strong control over the various regions of the country and 
remained jealous of maintaining its authority across the country. Koryo- had always 
needed a strong central dynastic order to assure an effective defense against outside 
invaders. And at the pinnacle of this system sat the king, who even if rendered 
powerless throughout much of the military period, nevertheless embodied legitimacy. 
In Japan local autonomy and the culture of the warrior grew. The opposite occurred 
in Korea. To govern, Choe Ch'unghOn, even though he developed his own private 
institutions, also restored many dynastic agencies and worked closely with civil 
elites, thereby reaffirming the importance of civil traditions. 
Late Kory-O 
     The process that saw civilian leaders reassert ultimate control over the kingdom 
was slow. It commenced with the overthrow of Ch'oe ]Di in 1258. Although Yu 
Kybng, a civilian, and Kim Chun, a military official, joined to assassinate Ch'oe Ui, 
Im Y6n, a former stable groom, changed their plans and killed Kim and then tried 
to depose W6njong (1259-1274) who had just succeeded his father on the throne. 
Im YOn and a number of military officials opposed a civilian call for peace with the 
Mongols, but by the early 1260s Mongol domination was so paramount that the 
military leaders could not block them. The last throes of military authority came in 
1270 with the assassination of Im Ybn's son. Still unwilling to accept Mongol 
control, a number of military officials launched the famed Samby6lch'o Rebellion 
that combined Kory-O and Mongol forces ultimately crushed in 1273. From then on, 
the Mongols controlled a civilian-led Kory-0. 
     Kory6 never forgot its century of military rule. Although later Confucian 
scholars judged the military period as an aberration from the norm of civilian rule," 
the century following military control saw military leaders continuing to hold 
positions of responsibility. The dynasty never reverted to the harsh discrimination 
that military officials experienced in the years prior to the military coup of 1170. 
Even though under Mongol domination Koryo- underwent some institutional change, 
military officers functioned beside civilians in the governmental structure. 
     Many factors enhanced the status of the warrior in late Koryo^. To defeat the 
rebelling SambyOlch'o, Koryo- depended on its own military force. Once the 
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suppression ended, the Mongols dispatched these same troops to aid in their planned 
invasions of Japan. The Mongols, who had conquered through military force, 
depended on the valor of the warrior and sustained respect for military traditions. 
The Mongols had no inhibitions about using warriors to govern." 
     Between 1260 and 1394, John Duncan discovered, 2660 men held positions 
in the civil bureaucracy." Of 800 State Councilors from this same period, Duncan 
ascertained the background of 689 men. Seventy-nine or 11% of these State 
Councilors were of military background. This figure is certainly less than the 
percentage from the military period, but much more than the figures just prior to the 
1170 coup. Duncan, gleaning from the biographies of 20 men who appeared in tomb 
stone inscriptions, attempted to reconstruct patterns of career advancement. Of these 
20, seven advanced through the military into prestigious dynastic offices." 
     From this list, five of the seven became state councilors. Three-Ch6ng Ingyong, 
Won SOnji, and Cho YOnsu- had fathers and/or grandfathers who had held high dy-
nastic ranks. Duncan especially cites Cho YOnsu of the P'yongyang Cho lineage. 
After entering the ranks through the protective appointment, he became a recorder 
(noksa) in the military. He passed the state examination at 17, held posts in both 
the military and civil lines, and became a state councilor by the time he was 3 L" 
Like Cho, nearly all the other men who came from military backgrounds 
advanced systematically through the civil and military lines to the top positions in 
the kingdom. 
     The composition of the State Council during King Ch'ungmok's (1344-1348) 
and King Ch'ungjOng's (1348-1351) reigns clarifies these themes. At least 78 men 
have been identified as holding positions in the State Council during these two 
reigns. Eleven of those men, or 14%, have been clearly associated with the military 
        15 branch. Although the presence of military officials in the State Council is not as 
large as the figures noted in the military period, the percentage is greater than those 
in early Kory6, when few military officials participated in the State Council. 
     Pybn Vaes6p's own studies of Late Koryo- have offered additional findings. 
Many of the officials who went to the Yuan dynasty as envoys from the Kory6 
court carried military ranks. Interpreters such as Cho Ingyu and the above-mentioned 
Ch6ng IngyOng were of military background. These men and others of military 
lineage played various roles during late Kory-0, acting as court advisors, envoys, and 
State Councilors .31 Under King U (1374-1388) military officials played an especially 
active role. Men felt free to move across the increasingly blurred line separating 
military from civilian. Some held military and civil positions simultaneously, others 
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who had passed the state examination opted to become generals." Socially a similar 
picture emerges as within some elite families brothers and cousins were literati and 
generals. Women from civil households married into military families and sons of 
scholars married daughters of generals." 
     The military official found himself in a much better position than in early 
Kory-0. The trauma of the military coup of 1170 and the subsequent century of 
military control had done much to temper the arrogance of civil officials. 
Furthermore, for nearly 100 years Koryo- saw the Mongols in control of their 
kingdom. As the Mongol leaders carried no innate bias for or against the military 
official, the latter were able to operate free from earlier restraints. Even though the 
Mongols often assumed the power of suzerain, Koryo- still had to defend its borders 
from increasingly dogged Japanese pirate attacks in the south and Khitan incursions 
in the north. And by the middle of the 14th century, Kory-O started to confront the 
chaos evolving in northern China out of the collapse of the Yuan and the rise of 
the Ming. All of these crises required men with military skill to protect the 
kingdom. With military officials maintaining a modicum of respect and responsibility, 
a collective leadership of both warrior and courtier, military and civil officials, 
joined near the conclusion of the 14th century to end Koryb and inaugurate Chos6n.
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Conclusions 
From the start of the dynasty, the military official carried the institutional responsi-
bility to defend the kingdom. The dynasty accorded military officials with many of 
the same privileges that civil officials enjoyed and designed a system of ranks and 
stipends to protect their position. Those who reached the fifth rank or higher were 
allowed to name heirs to lower posts based on the protective appointment, and their 
children gain favored admission into the elite schools of the capital. Military 
officials possessed a modicum of financial security though land allotments, dynastic 
stipends, and other special grants. These privileges, institutionalized in the first 
century of the kingdom, continued throughout Kory-0. Through these techniques, the 
civil establishment initially successfully tamed and coopted the warrior into supporting 
the dynasty. 
     Socially the position of the military official was much more ambivalent. 
Military officials, maintaining pride in their heritage, carried a confidence and sense 
of dignity to their traditions. Fully conscious that it was the martial arm that had 
to rise to the defense of the dynasty, distinct military families emerged repeatedly, 
providing sons to be generals. Such families can be found in all periods of the 
dynasty. But not all military officials could boast of distinguished lineages. In 
contrast to the civilian branch, it was easier for people of less exalted backgrounds 
to advance into government positions from the military. In this respect the military 
potentially provided an important social outlet by allowing men of economically 
impoverished origins an opportunity to enter government service. However, as the 
military an-n included men of diverse origins who were not necessarily skilled in 
letters, it lacked a social standing equivalent to that held by civilians. 
     Military officials had to confront bias. The civil branch carried greater prestige 
for many reasons. To be a civil leader implied an ability to read and write. 
Mastering these skills was considered to be far more arduous and intellectually 
challenging than excelling in martial pursuits. Civil lineages also believed they were 
socially more esteemed and free from the taint of humble backgrounds. This 
attitude, most extreme in the first centuries of the dynasty, contributed to the 1170 
coup. And even during the military period this partiality continued. The leading 
military families sustained civilian principles and sought to take on civil norms by 
preparing their sons or grandsons to sit for state examinations and advancing them 
through civil avenues. 
     Except for the military period, when generals forcefully commanded the 
dynasty, the quickest and surest path to the top offices remained through the civil 
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branch. When confronting major issues, the dynasty nearly always opted for 
non-martial solutions first. As was the case with Chinese traditions, only when 
appeasement, bribery, and diplomacy failed, was military might employed. Force was 
just one solution within the bag of statecraft. To the people of Koryb, their greatest 
heroes, after the dynastic founder Wang Ko-n, were civilian officials who excelled in 
writing and diplomacy. Although the people of Silla aspired to emulate the actions 
of their conquering warriors, the people of Koryo- esteemed the scholar. The nonns 
of the literary elite, not the warrior, became the accepted values of all, commoner 
and aristocrat alike. 
     And yet, by mid-Kory6 this esteem for the civil had been tempered. The 
military coup, through which the military officials finally reasserted their role in 
determining dynastic policy, changed the course of Kory-O and momentarily shifted 
the balance to favor the warrior. For the last half of the dynasty, throughout both 
the periods of military rule and Mongol domination, the divisions separating military 
from civil relaxed as civil control moderated. Not only did military officials assume 
a more active and respected role in governance, but socially there was a bluffing of 
distinctions between military and civilian families. Although the subordination of 
military to civil continued into late Koryo, the tensions separating the two lines all 
but disappeared. 
     A strong centralized state, which Koryo- was, mandated a military authority 
ancillary to the civil structure. As Koryo-, in its process of centralization, attempted 
to adapt Chinese models to its ruling apparatus, the military tradition became a 
focus of contention. Although the court and civil elites initially asserted their authority 
over the military, the problems posed by the demands for Kory-O to defend its 
borders and maintain internal security enabled the military officials to sustain their 
beleaguered position. Drawing on their rich tradition of arms bearing, the military 
officials ultimately had to fight or face total subordination. A compromise emerged 
in the last century of Koryo- with the reassertion of civil domination coupled with 
the reaffirmation of the importance of the military tradition within this structure. 
Kory6 mirrored neither China nor Japan. The combination of civilian institutional 
development and the compactness of the country prevented the kingdom from breaking 
into battling entities as had happened in Japan. But the needs for a strong defense 
against invaders north and south, combined with the vision of a weakened civilian 
Sung state and an indigenous tradition of aristocratic warrior rule, helped bolster the 
role of the military official in late Koryo-, in marked contrast to China. 
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